


# A Diplomatic Supremo in Africa: Priming International Relations Policy & Practice on Regional Integration, Peace & Security

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## Abstract


The philosophical underpinning of Ethiopia's overseas, overland and national security policies augurs on diplomatic activities trained at advancing a pluralist society and serving the country's rapid economic development. Challenged by poverty and El Nino droughts, Ethiopia is consciously pursuing structural transformation meeting the MDGs and successively implementing the SDGs. Located in a turbulent region, new martial and security scenarios in the *Greater Horn of Africa* with Yemen as the epicentre, one may ask if the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) move into the greater Horn will have a destabilising effect Ethiopia. Is its incursion onto one of the most contested regions (*The Horn's pariah state*) as a staging point or will this embolden the irredentist agenda of the *pariah state* and *Al Shabaab*?"



Regional integration and economic development is difficult. Eloquent testimony to this effect is provided by the list of *advanced economies* compiled by the IMF. There are functioning models to emulate, a consensus concerning the characteristics of economies that have successfully developed, and decades of experience with a wide range of policy prescriptions. Ethiopia has moved quickly to integrate the region with power supply, road and rail networks (Djibouti, Sudan, Somaliland, Puntland, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, etc.). Ethiopia's move to allow Somalilanders to move freely with goods and services into Ethiopia in the early nineties has had immense contri-

bution to peace in that unrecognised nation. The recommendations augur on a need for a clear policy and strategy on the GCC venture in the Red Sea and Chinese investment and branding Ethiopia. Unless the overall strategy rings true about its people, there is little chance that it will be believed or endorsed by the population, much more the rest of the world. Furthermore, in a digital era that claims to have made diplomats irrelevant but still make the core of international relations, a meritocratic strategy must transform diplomacy into the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Key words: *diplomacy, international relations, regional security, regional integration,*



## 1. Introduction

International relations, an interdisciplinary subject that syndicates political science, economics, finance, history, foreign languages and other fields, is becoming ever more important as the world becomes more globalised. Various theories have been propounded to explain IR. Political realism is a state-centric thought. States must help themselves to survive, as global governance is anarchic. *Neorealism or structural realism* contends that the effect of structure (the anarchic international system and the distribution of capabilities across units) must be taken into account in explaining state behaviour. *Idealism or Utopianism* is a school of thought that holds a state should make its internal political philosophy the goal of its foreign policy. *Liberalism* holds that state preferences, rather than state capabilities, are the primary determinant of state behaviour, through co-operation and interdependence, peace can be achieved.

The *democratic peace theory* argues that liberal democracies can never have conflicts among themselves. *Complex interdependence* undergirds the fact that *states are coherent units and are the dominant actors in international relations; force is a usable and effective instrument of policy and the assumption that there is a hierarchy in international politics*. *Post-liberal theory* claims that in the modern, globalized world, states are driven to cooperate in order to ensure security and sovereign interests (a swing from a right to a duty and autonomy). The key notion of *constructivism or social constructivism* is *international politics is shaped by persuasive ideas, collective values, culture and social identities and international reality is socially constructed by cognitive structures, which give meaning to the material world*.

The philosophical underpinning of Ethiopia's overseas, overland and national security policies augurs on diplomatic activities trained at advancing a pluralist society and serving the country's rapid economic development. These objectives are the requisite basis for keeping alive the vision of freedom the founding fathers have penned in blood. Ethiopia's foreign policy serves the twin objectives: rapid economic development, which aims to provide all members of society with benefits, and pluralism to ensure the most complete participation of nations and nationalities in administering their own affairs. Furthermore, it has zeroed in its diplomatic activities on the structural transformation, trade, investment and tourism. Its national security is inextricably fastened with rapid transformation and the rough neighbourhood it resides in. Challenged by poverty and El Nino droughts, it is consciously pursuing structural transformation by aiming at productivity and competitiveness of smallholders, as well as promoting industrialization, value addition and export development. Ethiopia has met all the MDGs and is successively implementing the current SDGs. Regionally; it is becoming the energy hub to neighbouring nations.

Ethiopia's role as an African hegemon is also grounded on founding the African Union. In the 1960s, a number of African states expressed a growing desire for more unity within the continent and two opinionated groups emerged in this respect: The Casablanca bloc wanted a federation while the Monrovia bloc felt that unity should be achieved gradually, through economic cooperation. The dispute was eventually resolved when Emperor Haile Selassie I invited the two groups to Addis Ababa, where the OAU and its headquarters were subsequently established. The Charter of the Organisation was signed by 32 independent African states. Ethiopia surrounded by a turbulent sub-region, devastated by civil war. The test for Somalia is to interlace a united state out of a collapsed nation, torn into pieces. To the west lies Sudan, a power that espoused Sha'ria and that sustains conflicts in the Blue Nile, Kordofan, and Darfur precincts and South Sudan's civil war. To the north lies Eritrea, isolated and subject to international sanctions, it is accused of gross rights violations (Rondos, 2016).

This lecture addresses the *international affairs, regional integration, martial and security scenarios* in the *Greater Horn of Africa*. In this regard, it may not be an over-statement to say that Ethiopia foreign policy is augured on *social constructivism shaped by persuasive ideas, collective values, culture and social identities*. Its sub-regional constructive outreach is predicated on infrastructure and service integration and helping create proactively an economic society in principalities such as Somaliland, that has proven to be not only peaceful but a beacon of democracy in a troubled region.

## 2. Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FNSPS)

The Political Objectives enshrined in the Constitution state, “Guided by democratic principles, Government shall promote and support the People's self-rule at all levels and respect the identity of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples. Accordingly, Government shall have the duty to strengthen ties of equality, unity and fraternity among them” (Article 88). Similarly, the Principles for External Relations of the constitution are augured “on promotion of policies of foreign relations based on the protection of national interests and respect for the sovereignty of the country and mutual respect for national sovereignty and equality of states and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. It is to ensure that the foreign relation policies are based on mutual interests and equality of states, to observe international agreements promoting national interests, forge economic union and fraternal relations with other African countries and seek and support peaceful solutions to international disputes” (Article 86).

The Principles for National Defence enshrined in the Constitution state “The composition of the national armed forces shall reflect the equitable representation of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia with a civilian minister. The armed forces shall protect the sovereignty of the country and carry out any responsibilities as may be assigned to them under any state of emergency declared in accordance with the Constitution. The armed forces shall at all times obey and respect the Constitution. The armed forces shall carry out their functions free of any partisanship to any political organisation(s) (Article 87)”.

The Economic Objectives enshrined in the Constitution state “Government shall have the duty to formulate policies, which ensure that all Ethiopians can benefit from the country's legacy of intellectual and material resources and equal opportunity to improve their economic condition and equitable distribution of wealth among them. Government shall take measures to avert and mitigate any natural and human-made disasters. Government shall provide special assistance to nations, nationalities and peoples least advantaged in economic and social development. It shall promote the participation of the people in the formulation of national development policies and programmes at all times. It shall also have the duty to support the initiatives of the people in their development endeavours. It shall ensure the participation of women in equality with men in all economic and social development endeavours and shall endeavour to protect and promote the health, welfare and living standards of the working population of the country” (Article 89).

## 3. Regional Peace and Security

### 3.1. The Greater Horn of Africa

Alexander Rondos (2016:1), asserts so varied is the *Greater Horn of Africa* (the greater Horn), a diversity of geography, history, population, politics, and culture that has made the region so prone to conflict within its societies and between its countries that people pluck what they wish from that variety to generalize. Those differences have allowed outsiders to play proxy politics with the region that has been at an historical crossroads. Traders have travelled through the region, north to south and west to east. Empires have grown and subsided. Islam and Christianity embedded themselves in the region from the earliest days of each faith. The river Nile rises in the region and flows through to Egypt, linking all the countries in a mortal sorority for existence.

Along its eastern coast, it gives on to the *Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean*, its people engaged in trade for millennia, linking to the Gulf and beyond. Nevertheless, there is one overriding truth about the greater Horn. It straddles a geographical space of such strategic importance that those who treat it with indifference pay a price for their neglect, whilst those who try to manipulate it get their fingers burnt. The Horn comprising of *Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia & Somalia* has attracted once again the attention of greater powers”. “Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have contracted Eritrea's government for assistance in the War on Yemen, using the East African state as a transit and logistics base for their operations, as well as 4000 of its troops for cannon fodder in Aden. Add to it the Qatar (a peninsular pipsqueak uses its financial largesse to flex power disproportionate to its tiny size). Its soldiers that have already been present on the ground for a few

years to *mediate* the border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti, and the most important members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) *have unexpectedly converged in what many might think to be among one of the most unlikely of places*. While it may have been difficult to foresee this happening, in hindsight it actually makes quite a lot of sense. Contrary to the conventional assessment that this is about Yemen, the argument can be made that it is also just as much about Ethiopia as well” (Korybko, 2015:1).

*The confrontation within the Muslim world has led to a realignment of loyalties in the region. The conflict in Yemen has raised concerns about the security of trade through the Red Sea. The jugular vein of trade between East and West is less protected than ever. In geopolitical terms, the Horn is the fragile and much-fractured neighbourhood. It is also the backyard of countries in the Muslim world. Confronted by conflicts, the latter have decided to secure actively their interests in the Horn. The people of the Horn will have to steer a delicate path from the vagaries of strategic clientelism. Outsiders will also do well to understand the region its history and politics lest they think that the greater Horn is an easy proxy* (Rothkopf, 2016).

Ethiopia sits at the centre of a martial cauldron. Devastated by civil war, the test for Somalia is to interlace a united state out of a collapsed nation, torn into pieces. To the west lies Sudan, a power that espoused Sha’ria sustains conflicts in the Blue Nile, Kordofan, and Darfur and South Sudan’s civil war. To the north lies Eritrea, isolated and subject to international sanctions, it is accused of gross rights violations (Rondos, 2016). This lecture questions the martial and security scenarios in the *Greater Horn of Africa*. Is the GCC’s move into the greater Horn predicated on destabilising Ethiopia as much as silencing Shite ‘rebels’? Is the GCC incursion onto one of the most contested regions (*The Horn’s pariah state*) as a staging point or is there a veiled schema that may embolden the irredentist agenda of the *pariah state* and *Shabaab* in Somalia? (Ibid, Korybko)

### 3.2. The Horn: maritime trade, conflicts

The Horn of Africa is one of the most geostrategic regions in the world due to its location along the Bab el Mandeb strait that connects the Gulf of Aden with the Red Sea. It is one of two maritime chokepoints (the other being the Suez Canals) that link Europe with South, Southeast, and East Asia. All sea bound trade between Europe and Eurasia must transit through its narrow passage. As could be expected, this makes control over the strait a heightened prize for any power or combination thereof, and it is not for naught that most Great Powers scrambled their navies to the region ostensibly to *combat piracy* (Korybko, 2015).

Historically, Abyssinia (Ethiopia) has been the target of attack for religious and territorial gain reasons. Dervish, Mahadists and Italian invaders have challenged Ethiopia’s Emperors Yohannes and Menelique. The Greater Somalia project of Ziad Barre had challenged Ethiopia several times. Egypt under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, led by Isma’il Pasha, the Khedive of Egypt, who became the ruler of Egypt in 1863, sought to expand his reign to the land of Abyssinia and control the Blue Nile. The armies of Yohannes and Isma’il met at Gundat on the morning of 16 Nov 1875. The Egyptians were destroyed. News of this huge defeat was suppressed in Egypt for fear that it would undermine the Khedive. They tried again to invade from the north, but were again defeated at the battle of Guræ in March 1876. On 7<sup>th</sup> Dec 1895, Ethiopia gained her victory at Amba Alage, Mequelle on 21 Jan 1896 and at Adwa on 1<sup>st</sup> of March 1896 against the Italian invaders (Berkeley, 1902 in Gebresellase, 2006).

Alex De Waal (2016:1) writing in Foreign Policy states that the “Horn of Africa region, central to the world’s maritime trade, is also beginning to fall apart. Back in 2002, the prime minister of Ethiopia drafted a *foreign policy* and *national security white paper* for his country. Before finalizing it, he confided to me a *nightmare scenario* - not included in the published version - *that could upend the balance of power in the Horn of Africa region*. The scenario went like this: *Sudan is partitioned into a volatile south and an embittered north. The south becomes a sinkhole of instability, while the north is drawn into the Arab orbit. Meanwhile, Egypt awakens from its decades-long torpor on African issues and resumes its historical stance of attempting to undermine Ethiopia, with which it has a long-standing dispute over control of the Nile. It does so by trying to bring Eritrea and Somalia into its sphere of influence, thereby isolating the government in*

A map of the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. It shows major oil routes with black arrows originating from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and red arrows originating from the UAE. Red starburst symbols indicate conflict zones in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. The map also labels countries like Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, and the United Arab Emirates. The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are also labeled.

“These fissures in the Greater Horn of Africa have been cracked wide by the sudden GCC invasion of Yemen and the co-opting of Eritrea (Assab), Somaliland (Berbera) and Somalia (Mogadishu) into the picture. In practice, that has meant winning over less powerful countries along the African coast of the Red Sea — Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia — a region that Ethiopia has sought to place within its sphere of influence. The Saudi presence along the African Red Sea coast has grown more sharply pronounced since its March 2015 military intervention in Yemen, which drew in Egypt as part of a coalition of Sunni Arab states battling Iran-backed Houthis. Nevertheless, the most important geopolitical outcome of the Yemen intervention has been Eritrea, which capitalised on the war to escape severe political and economic isolation. Alexander Rondos (2016) identifies three major challenges that confront the Horn region.

- “To overcome these challenges is not easy. The Horn of Africa is freighted with divisive historical baggage. How do we make sense, then, of this region? It shares no common colonial past that left a now increasingly distant imprint. The region has succumbed to most vicious and still unresolved civil wars and some nations have simply fragmented with Eritrea and South Sudan



seceding. No other part of the world has more UN & AU peacekeepers (or enforcers). Few parts of the world have generated, and yet host, more refugees” (Ibid, Rondos).

#### 4. Regional Integration Initiatives

##### 4.1. Ethiopia’s GTP Vision & strategy

*Economic development is difficult. Eloquent testimony to this effect is provided by the list of “advanced economies” compiled by the International Monetary Fund: it consists of only 33 economies (out of a total of 183 in the dataset), 17 of which are small, with populations of less than 10 million, including four with less than one million. This is a striking fact, given that there are functioning models to emulate, a consensus concerning the characteristics of economies that have successfully developed, and decades of experience with a wide range of policy prescriptions. The difficulty of actually getting the process to work undoubtedly reflects the fact that development cannot be engineered. It is organic in nature, involving the generation of a complex ecology of different types of firms interacting, developing their own corporate cultures and bodies of firm-specific knowledge, as well as the relatively more straightforward tasks of building infrastructure and institutions. In the end, the economy’s output, its production processes, and perhaps most importantly, the jobs and knowledge base of its workers are transformed. The word “transformation” in the GTP is thus well chosen (Ciuriak & Preville, 2010). The GTP is based on long-term vision and lessons drawn from its implementation are the bases for conceiving the GTPII, prepared considering growth constraining factors that emerged in the course of implementation and external shocks (Costantinos, et al., 2010:4).*

Ethiopia’s vision for sustaining the rapid and broad-based growth path hinges on the following pillars. These are *sustaining faster and equitable economic growth, maintaining agriculture as a major source of economic growth, creating favourable conditions for the industry to play key role in the economy, enhancing expansion and quality of infrastructure development, enhancing expansion and quality of social development, building capacity, deepen good governance, and promote women and youth empowerment and equitable benefit. The strategy hinges on public investments, an agricultural transformation, a consumer goods revolution, and emerging export industries*—will support a rapid pace of economic expansion in Ethiopia in the coming years. Massive public infrastructure investments are set to deliver a wide range of public goods—roads, railways, power plants, schools, and clinics—while simultaneously propping up thousands of private sector companies involved in building and maintaining these brand new public facilities. An agricultural transformation—involving a proliferation of modern commercial farms as well as a leap in the productivity of smallholder agriculture—is in our view a very realistic possibility in the next few years, and will hence be a key driver of economy-wide growth. (Access Capital Research, 2012)



Ethiopia has moved quickly to integrate the region with power supply, road and rail networks (Djibouti, Sudan, Somaliland, Puntland, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, etc.). *Ethiopia’s move to allow Somalilanders to move freely with goods and services into Ethiopia in the early nineties has had immense contribution to peace in that unrecognised nation.* There are great lessons to be learned, but need the support of IFIs. These have been fundamental to achieving the MDGs too and will be the basis for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) coming up. Such an infrastructure is destined to transform the region into an economic society will nurture peace and security.

##### 4.2. The Growth & Transformation Plan (GTP)

In recent years, public investment has been one of the major drivers of economic growth in Ethiopia. Government spending has doubled in just the last three years and quadrupled in the past six years. Expressed in relation to GDP, total government spending now makes up nearly

one-fifth of GDP. Besides the growth in government, the activities of state enterprises have multiplied in parallel, a trend best captured by the five-fold rise in their borrowing from the banking system. The combined economic weight of both government and state enterprise activity has led to a situation where roughly two-thirds of all banking system credit is now directed to the public sector. Ethiopia now has the highest capital expenditure share in government spending in Africa. This means that much more spending is being funnelled to capital projects (roads, power plants, water systems, etc.) and to capital equipment (machinery and equipment imports), rather than to current expenditure items such as wages, salaries, and operational and maintenance costs. The public investments planned for the coming five years can be seen as putting in place the necessary hardware and software needed for a modernizing economy (Access Capital Research, 2011).

#### 4.2.1. Hardware investments:

This encompass the whole range of physical and infrastructural facilities needed to allow the movement of labour, goods, and services across a market economy—roads, railways, power plants to generate electricity, electricity grid networks, water and sewage facilities, etc.

**Roads, Railways and Air Infrastructure.** Ethiopia is building 71,000 kilometres of new roads, to virtually all communities and modern eight-lane expressways. It is constructing 2,395 kilometres of new railways linking Addis Ababa with Djibouti, linking selected domestic cities, and within Addis Ababa. It is raising Ethiopian Airlines' air fleet by 35 additional aircraft, (4 new cargo carriers) and building a huge new cargo hub with a capacity to handle 125,000 tons per day in perishable export commodities.

**Power generation & distribution:** Generating 10,000 MW of new power generation capacity and laying 132,000 kilometres of new electricity distribution lines and the expansion of electricity coverage to 75 % of the country. Water supply and irrigation is expanding the water supply infrastructure to 99 % of the population and the drilling of some 3,000 water wells per year and increasing in irrigation coverage 16 %. In industry & commercial agriculture, textiles, metals and engineering, cement, fertilizers and sugar production and three million hectares of land is available for investment. In Oil & Minerals, exploration is going on by more than 25 companies for oil, gas, minerals...

#### 4.2.2. Software investments


These are best seen as the human capacity building required to run an increasingly modernizing national economy—from basic health care to ensure a capable labour force to the provision of adequate education at the primary, secondary and tertiary level, in addition to specialized vocational and technical training schools needed to run an increasingly complex economy. The first poverty reduction program was formulated in 2001. Given the size of the resource gap and the limited capacity of the economy to mobilize domestic resources, the financial gap is covered from donors' assistance. New aid modalities support the nation by generating national consensus on GTP I & GTP II. This is aligned with development assistance to achieve MDGs and SDGs and aligned with principles to promote aid effectiveness.<sup>1</sup>

### 5. Ethiopia's leadership Role in Africa

#### 5.1. Ethiopia a pragmatic snapshot of country's foreign policy in the sub region

Mohammed, A. (2015) asserts, "Conflict in its very nature disrupt peace and tranquillity in this overly intertwined world, the spill over effect counts a lot as success of a given state is directly related to peace, amity and stability in its neighbours. There were and are zealous critics that

**New Roads built 1950-2015**



always tend to consider Ethiopia's diplomatic engagement in neighbouring countries either as farcical or having an interventionist mentality. Hence, it is imperative to enunciate scenarios (if any) that warrants Ethiopia's engagement with peace making initiatives in neighbouring countries and what returns it may accrue by doing so. For a nation to do well, government machineries and resilient institutions should be put in place. Here, it is pertinent to make a historical comparison on the situation of Ethiopia and Somalia in the early 1990's. Ethiopia by that time was hell to dwell as the *Dergue* regime suppressed all sorts of dissent by every means. In Somalia, the regime was already fractured as it could not provide requisite peace, stability and necessities for citizens.

“Nonetheless, after the demise of the aristocracy, what miracle on earth happened for Ethiopia to emerge as a strong, thriving nation whereas Somalia; as a struggling and failed state? The bottom line is that, Ethiopia healing from those scars of the *Dergue* hugely engaged itself in building strong institutions, which in turn helped in consolidating power. The role of individuals and shady elite interests were curbed and everyday life channelled through predetermined rules and procedures. Accountability established in all the system to rectify misdeeds. Yet in Somalia, instead of establishing effective and effectual institutions, the key players in every aspect of life became powerful individuals and clan chiefs, which personified the state system according to their personality cult and demand. A quintessential manifestation for trans-boundary chaos in the sub-region is Somalia. The conflict in both Somalia and South Sudan brought about large-scale humanitarian chaos leaving millions into catastrophic starvation and subsequent increment in death toll. This would require the international community and development partners to divert large sum of wealth (which could have been destined for development) into humanitarian assistance.

“The success of Ethiopia is directly correlated to peace and stability in its neighbouring states. Its engagement in bringing law and order in those countries is driven by the desire and only the desire to bring about peace, stability and development to the conflict torn and prone sub-region: not the mediocre thinking of mere 'expansionism' as some declare. Otherwise, the logic of the sinking ship and its crew will hold true to the Somalia and South Sudan people and the sub-region at large. Ethiopia, as written in black and white under the FNSP document, is fully determined for good neighbourliness and friendship among states. It reiterates that sustenance of its growth and development cannot be secured if neighbouring countries are at persistent violence and instability. Hence, to avoid the spill over effect, it is doing its best to bring peace and stability in the sub-region and its outcome can be witnessed from fostering peace making causes and the role it plays in the fight against international terrorism”.

## 5.2. A need for clear ‘Strategy’ on GCC venture in Eritrea

*After the revelation came out that Eritrea had sold its sovereignty to the Gulf, Ethiopia firmly declared that it would not tolerate the facility being used for any aggressive designs. At the moment, it's widely thought that a type of no-conflict-no-peace parity existed between Ethiopia and Eritrea that has kept the conventional (but not asymmetrical) peace between them since the mutually disastrous war from 1998-2000. Nevertheless, the GCC base could theoretically tip the balance in favour of Eritrea (Korybko, 2015). Understanding the enormity of the threat that could be facing it, Ethiopia should signal to its Gulf counterparts (especially in this case GCC and “anti-terrorist” coalition leader Saudi Arabia) that it would not tolerate the Horn’s formal incorporation into any military alliance.*

Indeed, the GCC understands that Ethiopia will act pre-emptively to stop such a development out of defence of its national interests. Hence, they would not want to put Eritrea in any sort of danger at the moment, likely explaining why they did not allow Eritrea to join (although it likely would have, if offered). Notwithstanding the humiliating defeat of the Egyptian forces in the 60's & 70's in Yemen, the GCC still places importance on the Eritrean facility's use in assisting in the War on Yemen. Conversely, an alternative but complementary possibility is, if it is realized that Eritrea would probably join the alliance, it would spark a formal continuation of the war if it joined the bloc and instead waged against it out, for self-preservation. *The UN commission finds that systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations have been and are being committed in*



*Eritrea under the authority of the Government. Patterns of systematic human rights violations have been identified, taking into account several factors. The commission finds that the current situation of human rights in Eritrea is the tragic product of an initial desire to protect and ensure the survival of the young State that very quickly degenerated into the use of totalitarian practices?* (UNOHR, 2005).

Against this background and with the intention of easing the pressure on the people of Eritrea, the foreign policy must articulate a concrete strategy to end the stalemate between the two sisterly nations and forge good relations between the sisterly peoples of these nations. If this is not possible, other strategies must be developed by foreign policy wonks to provide the government with options and scenarios for action.

### **5.3. A need for a Policy on Investment & Loans**

Wallis, William and Burgis, Tom (2010) assert, “If China’s courtship of Africa had been formalised in marriage, then the bride might be developing early symptoms of the seven-year itch. In parallel, a more vigorous debate has begun about the nature of African ties with China, specifically how beneficial these will prove in years to come. Hyperactive Chinese involvement in construction projects is undoubtedly helping address the infrastructure shortcomings that hold up growth – with roads, rail, dams and pipelines appearing with astonishing speed. Put together, all forms of Chinese financing more than match inflows from traditional and multilateral donors. Meanwhile, the flood of Chinese émigrés working on big state-backed projects, large-scale trading ventures and commercial farms, they can be found selling car parts, growing vegetables and running restaurants in most African capitals. Altogether, it is now difficult to consider African prospects without mention of its pre-eminent foreign suitor, which, in the past decade, has increased trade with Africa to more than \$100bn.

In a sure sign of power ebbing from west to east, the prosperity of the poorest continent is now equally – or more – dependent on demand and investment from developing nations – China foremost among them. From the outset, the fiercest critics of China’s advance into Africa have been in the West. China-bashers see in Beijing’s mercantilist expansion the same exploitative patterns that typified Africa’s past relations with Europe. They worry too that Beijing’s engagement is undermining western proselytising about democracy and letting corrupt and murderous leaders off the hook, just as governance was beginning to improve. However, there has always been a strong whiff of hypocrisy about this argument. Chinese officials are also critical of the West’s record and vigorous in their own defence. *Western countries should set an example by making public the resources they have grabbed in Africa in the past 400 years. Only after that can we come to the issue of China’s transparency*, Li Ruogu, president of the Ex-Im Bank of China, said recently. However, many fear that, while the direction of trade is changing, its nature, involving raw material exports and the import of finished goods, is not. Hence, Ethiopia needs to develop clear policies on the support it receives from China and the need to diversify its investment originators.

### **5.4. Branding & Scenario Planning**


#### **5.4.1. Citizens must believe in the brand before the world can**

Lodged in a highly turbulent region in the Horn of Africa, the legitimacy of the elections and democratic process underway in Ethiopia will depend in important ways on it being perceived as reasonably honest, transparent, and accountable in the execution of political responsibility. Indeed, there are too many instances in the history of the country, which prove the transcendence of ethno-centrism. It is apparent that as the country enters this new era of political pluralism, there is a need to overhaul the political machinery and develop institutional alternatives to the *ethicized* party structures. “Despite the upsurge of ethnic politics in the past generation, it is abundantly clear that the bonds of *Etyopiyawinet* are alive and well” (Levin, 2006). In the above review, the attempt has been to identify some of the impediment for the consolidation and preservation of democracy in Ethiopia. The passage to democracy in Ethiopia is a political development *problématique*, not merely because of the challenges of balancing the desire for an immediate democratic transition with the reality of initiating such a process in a country with a limited democratic

experience and a civil society marred by high levels of illiteracy. The Ethiopian transition was bound to have shortcomings that stem in part from historical and structural conditions marked by authoritarian and militarist traditions for a good part of its history. Thus, politically there exist almost insurmountable obstacles to the flourishing of democratic governance. However, other nations with identical historical features, have managed to install and maintain multi-party democratic systems and hence, there is no reason to believe that democracy is doomed in Ethiopia.

Scholars looking at nation branding from a **political perspective** see it as coordinated government efforts to manage a country's image in order to promote tourism, investment and foreign relations. In this light, nation branding is seen as a powerful political tool, especially for small, peripheral nations eager to strengthen their economic position and to compete against the economic, financial or military clout of superpowers (Kaefer, 2014). **Unless the overall branding strategy rings true about its people, there is little chance that it will be believed or endorsed by the population, much more the rest of the world.**

Fig.1 mainstreaming foreign policy in regional security and integration



#### 5.4.2. Meritocracy in diplomatic assignments

A skilled and committed state, civic, diplomatic and martial leadership can mitigate conditions that are hostile to a pluralist society and elements that compromise the economy. In addition to the existing threats on the Eritrean and Somali front, clearly, the outcome of peace and security scenarios in Eritrea, Sudan and Southern Sudan crisis and foreign support to terrorism in the Horn will have a regional impact. This could manifest in force projection by these combination of elements that have historically been constant threat to the security of the Ethiopian state. *Hence, the need to maintain adequate martial preparedness capacity to win the hearts & minds of the region, whatever the outcomes of the security analysis may be. The effort requires careful attention to the distinctive agendas, interests and concepts that determine the domain of military and para-military activities and the framework of political thought, discourse and action through which regional contestants translate these specific organizational elements into a broader pattern of ideas and apply them generally to the security of the Ethiopian state.*

#### 5.4.3. Diplomacy in a Digital Era

Diplomatic missions, at least in their traditional form, are facing a crunch of pertinence. The information age and globalisation of the 21<sup>st</sup> century have dramatically changed the way nations interact with each other. The speed at which information is exchanged, economic crises, complex security menaces, and the way heads of state communicate in real time all raise the issue whether diplomats are still relevant. Gone are the days when the Treaty of Wuchalle between Ethiopia's

Emperor Meneliké and Italy were concluded through diplomats in the 1880s. The world is changing fundamentally. Information transcends plans & frontiers, networks are fast swapping the pecking order and transparency is the clarion call of the day, crowding out diplomatic conceit. Trillions move swiftly and unimpeded across a global network of swifts.

In this world of instantaneous big data and social media where heads of state proclaim positions on international matters without even telling their embassies, old-style diplomats struggle to sustain their relevance. Hence, while Ethiopia's diplomatic missions still make the bulwark of international affairs, fundamental change needed include the use of *revolution in information technology*, piggy bagging the *proliferation of new media*, comprehending *globalization of business and finance*, *widening participation of publics in international relations and complex issues that transcend national boundaries*.

#### 5.4.4. Scenario planning

Scenario planning is a strategic tool to make flexible long-term plans, a process of visualizing what future conditions or events are probable, their consequences or effects and how to respond to or benefit from them. It is in large part an adaptation and generalization of classic methods used by military intelligence. The original method was that a group of analysts would generate simulation games for policy makers that combine known facts about the future, such as demographics, geography, military, political, industrial information and mineral reserves, with key driving forces identified by considering social, technical, economic, environmental and political trends and gaming the behaviour of opponents. There are three scenarios of state building: *legitimacy and accountability of states through democratic governance by holding elections and constitutional processes, economic liberalization, and strengthening the capacity of states to fulfill core functions of an effective state*. Lee Kuan Yew, (Singapore) brought political stability, which together with rule of law, were essential for economic progress, thereby creating an Asian Tiger, meritocratic state, transforming it from the *third world to the first world in a single generation* (Erdmann, 2015).

## 6. Conclusion

Ethiopia's FNSP has definitely guided the nation for a quarter of a century with little or no hiccups. The support provided by Ethiopia to Somalia in setting up the TFG and eventually the government is a classic case of good diplomacy. The negotiations over South Sudan Civil War have been led by Ethiopia's former foreign minister, Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin. Addis Ababa, as the diplomatic and political of Africa had had its share of contribution to peace and security. Ethiopia's leadership of IGAD and NEPAD has also bought significant dividends to the sub-region and the continent.

Over the past five years, Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti and the self-declared republic of Somaliland have all been attacked by Somalia-based Al-Shabaab militants. Ethiopia has evaded a large-scale attack. Al-Shabaab's highest profile attack in Kenya's *Westgate shopping mall* and *Garissa University* is due to its Kenyan affiliate, Al-Hijra and a high level of corruption with the security institutions. The country's secret to preventing attacks is public involvement. Although Ethiopia's military is considered among the strongest in the region, independent security experts say Ethiopian security forces are strong because Al-Shabaab is just one of several threats to the country. Ethiopia knows its threats to security from Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan and internal dissent from the Ogaden. To that effect, Ethiopia has managed to build its security network very strongly. Its forces continue to fight al-Shabaab in Somalia. Working in conjunction with AU troops, they have made significant gains against a militant group that remains a security threat to the East African region (Wolf, 2015).

While FNSP is a success, Ethiopia needs to review it with the items that have been listed earlier. These include the migration of the policy into the 21<sup>st</sup> century digital age and clear strategies for the Horn eminent challenges facing it today.

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<sup>i</sup> In education & health, increasing (net) primary enrolment to 100% and raising the number of students at government universities to near half a million students (from 185,000 at present). It ensures universal education to 8<sup>th</sup> grade; raising the number of students at Technical and Vocational schools to above one million (from 717,000 at present); public universities that will have 40% of science/engineering students and ensuring 9,000 new medical school entrants annually. In health, it is reaching a 100 % primary health services coverage (from 89 %) through large-scale expansions in public health centres and hospitals and ensuring large reductions in infant and maternal mortality and the incidence of various diseases